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2 INRIA and LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Abstract. We analyse the Crowds anonymity protocol under the novel assump-
tion that the attacker has independent knowledge on behavioural patterns of in-
dividual users. Under such conditions we study, reformulate and extend Reiter
and Rubin’s notion of probable innocence, and provide a new formalisation for
it based on the concept of protocol vulnerability. Accordingly, we establish new
formal relationships between protocol parameters and attackers’ knowledge ex-
pressing necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure probable innocence.
1 Introduction
Anonymity protocols often use random mechanisms. It is therefore natural to think of
anonymity in probabilistic terms. Various notions of such probabilistic anonymity have
been proposed and a recent trend of work in formalizing these notions is directed at ex-
ploring the application of information-theoretic concepts (e.g. [18, 4–6, 1, 15]). In our
opinion, however, except a recent paper by Franz, Meyer, and Pashalidis [11] which ad-
dresses the advantage that an adversary could take of hints from the context in which the
protocol operates, such approaches fail to account for the fact that in the real world, the
adversary often have some extra information about the correlation between anonymous
users and observables. Consider for example the following simple anonymous voting
process. In a parliament composed by Labourists and Conservatives, one member voted
against a proposal banning minimum wages. Without any additional knowledge it is
reasonable to assume that the person is more likely to be in the most liberal political
group. If however we know in addition that one Conservative voted against, then it is
more reasonable to suspect the liberally-inclined Conservatives. Similarly, suppose that
in a classroom of n students the teacher asks to tick one of two boxes on a piece of paper
to indicate whether or not they are satisfied by her teaching. If n is small and the teacher
noticed that the pupils use pens of different colours, then she can use these colours to
partition the class so as to make the vote of some students more easily identifiable. Extra
knowledge of this kind, independent of the logic of the protocol used, can affect dra-
matically its security. The extra knowledge can either arise from an independent source,
as in the first example, or simply from the context in which the anonymity protocol is
run, as in the second example.
? The work of Catuscia Palamidessi has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-
0169-01 PANDA: PArallel aNd Distributed Analysis.
2 S. Hamadou, C. Palamidessi and V. Sassone and E. ElSalamouny
A relevant point in case is Reiter and Rubin’s Crowds protocol [16], which allows
Internet users to perform anonymous web transactions. The idea is to send the message
through a chain of users participating in the protocol. Each user in the ‘crowd’ must
establish a path between her and a set of servers by selecting randomly some users to
act as routers. The random selection process is performed in such a way that when a
user in the path relays a message, she does not know whether or not the sender is the
initiator of the message, or simply a forwarder like herself. Each user only has access
to messages routed through her, and some participants may be corrupted, i.e., they may
work together in order to uncover the identity of the initiator. It is well known that
Crowds cannot ensure strong anonymity [16, 3] in presence of corrupted participants,
but when the number of corrupted users is sufficiently small, it provides a weaker notion
of anonymity known as probable innocence. Informally, a sender is probably innocent
if to an attacker she is no more likely to be the originator than not to be.
Although Crowds has been widely analysed in the literature (e.g. [3, 15]), the fact
that independent information may be available to the attacker has been so far ignored.
We maintain that this is ultimately incompatible with achieving a comprehensive and
reliable analysis of the protocol, as attackers’ extra knowledge is inherent to Crowds.
In particular, as any request routed through an attacker reveals the identity of the target
server, a team of attackers will soon build up a host of observations suitable to classify
the behaviour of honest participants.
This paper is to the best of our knowledge the first to investigate the impact of the
attacker’s independent knowledge on the anonymity in the Crowds protocol.
Related work. Quantitative approach to the foundations of information-hiding has be-
came a very active and mature research field. Several various formal definitions and
frameworks have been proposed for reasoning about secure information flow analy-
sis (e.g. [19, 7–9]), side-channel analysis (e.g [14]) and anonymity. Our work follows
a recent trend in the analysis of anonymity protocols directed to the application of
information-theoretic notions (e.g. [17, 18, 4–6, 1, 15, 10, 2]).
The most related work to ours is the one of Reiter and Ruben [16], the one of Halpen
and O’Neill [12], and the recent paper of Chatzikokolakis, and Palamidessi [3]. In [16]
the authors propose a formal definition of probable innocence that considers the prob-
ability of observable events induced by actions of an anonymous user participating in
the protocol. They require that the probability of an anonymous user producing any ob-
servable to be less than one half. In [12] the authors formalize probable innocence in
terms of the adversary’s confidence that a particular anonymous event happened, after
performing an observation. Their definition requires that the probability of an anony-
mous events should be at most one half, under any observation. In [3] the authors argue
that the definition of [16] makes sense only for systems satisfying certain properties
while the definition of [12] depends on the probabilities of anonymous events which
are not part of the protocol. They propose a definition of probable innocence that tries
to combine the two previous ones by considering both the probability of producing
some observable and the adversary’s confidence after the observation.
Another recent work closely related to ours is the one of Smith’s [19] which pro-
poses a new metric for quantitative information flow based on the concept of vulnera-
bility as an alternative to previous metrics based on Shannon entropy and mutual infor-
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mation. Informally, the idea is that the adversary knows the a priori distributions of the
hidden (anonymous) events and always ‘bets’ on the most likely culprit. The a priori
vulnerability then is the probability that the adversary guesses the true culprit based
only on the a priori distribution. The a posteriori vulnerability is the average proba-
bility that the adversary guesses the true culprit based on the a posteriori probability
distribution on the agents after the observation.
The main difference between these approaches and ours is that they do not take into
account the very likely additional knowledge of the adversary about the correlation be-
tween the anonymous events and some observables independent from the behaviour of
the protocol. In this paper we first generalize the concepts of probable innocence and
vulnerability. Instead than just comparing the probability of being innocent with the
probability of being guilty, we consider the degree of the probability of being innocent.
Informally a protocol is α-probable innocent if for any anonymous user the probabil-
ity of being innocent is less than or equal to α. Similarly a protocol is α-vulnerable
if the a posteriori vulnerability of the anonymous users is less than or equal to α. We
prove that these two notions are related. In particular (α-)probable innocence implies
(α-)vulnerability and in the specific case when the a priori distribution of the anony-
mous events is uniform, they are equivalent. We furthermore extend these definitions in
order to cope with the extra independent knowledge of the adversary by computing the a
posteriori probability and the a posteriori vulnerability w.r.t to both the protocol observ-
ables and the independent observables. We show that the presence of extra knowledge
makes probable innocence (resp. vulnerability) more difficult to be achieved.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that our observations about the importance of
additional knowledge of the adversary are not entirely new. Indeed, as already noticed
above, Franz, Meyer, and Pashalidis [11] considered the fact that an adversary could
take advantage of hints from the context in which a protocol operates. However, though
that their approach is closely related to ours in spirit, it is not general in the sense that it
assumes a deterministic correlation between the anonymous events and the observable
hints and a uniform distribution on the anonymous events. Moreover, their metric is
associated to Shannon entropy which is recently proven by Smith [19] of being less
accurate than vulnerability-based metric.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows: in §2 we fix some basic
notations and recall the fundamental ideas of the Crowds protocol and its properties,
including the notion of probable innocence. In §3 we reformulate and extend probable
innocence using the idea of protocol vulnerability; §4 and §5 deliver our core technical
contribution by respectively extending probable innocence and vulnerability to the case
of attacker’s independent knowledge.
2 Preliminaries
This section describes our conceptual framework and briefly revises the Crowds proto-
col and the notion of probable innocence. We use capital letters A, B to denote discrete
random variables and the corresponding small letters a, b and calligraphic letters A,
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B for their values and set of values respectively. We denote by p(a), p(b) the proba-
bilities of a and b respectively and by p(a ∧ b) their joint probability. The conditional
probability of a given b is defined as
p(a | b) = p(a ∧ b)
p(b)
The Bayes theorem relates the conditional probabilities p(a | b) and p(b | a) as follows
p(a | b) = p(b | a) p(a)
p(b)
2.1 The framework
In this paper we consider a framework similar to the probabilistic approaches to anony-
mity and information flow used in (for instance) [13], [5], [15], and [19]. We restrict
ourselves to total protocols and programs with one high level (or anonymous) input
A, a random variable over a finite set A, and one low level output (observable) O, a
random variable over a finite setO. We represent a protocol/program by the matrix of the
conditional probabilities p(o j | ai), where p(o j | ai) is the probability that the low output
is o j given that the high input is ai. We assume that the high input is generated according
to an a priori publicly-known probabilistic distribution. An adversary or eavesdropper
can see the output of a protocol, but not the input, and he is interested in deriving the
value of the input from the observed output in one single try.
In this paper we will also assume that the attacker has access to the value of a
random variable S distributed over S that summarizes his additional knowledge (in-
formation) about A independent from the behavior of the protocol, as explained in the
introduction. The matrix of the conditional probabilities p(sk | ai) expresses the correla-
tion between the anonymous events and the additional knowledge of the adversary.
When | S | = 1 the adversary’s additional information about A is a trivial one and
cannot help his effort in determining the value of A. For example knowing the length
of a password in a fixed-length password system is a trivial information since all pass-
words have the same length. Trivial information allows us to model the absence of
additional information. The standard framework can therefore be seen as an instance of
our framework.
2.2 The Crowds Protocol and the definition of probable innocence
The protocol. Crowds is a protocol proposed by Reiter and Rubin in [16] to allow Inter-
net users performing anonymous web transactions by protecting their identity as origi-
nators of messages. The central idea to ensure anonymity is that the originator forwards
the message to another, randomly-selected user, which in turn forwards the message to
another user, and so on until the message reaches its destination (the end server). This
routing process ensures that, even when a user is detected sending a message, there is a
substantial probability that she is simply forwarding it on behalf of somebody else.
More specifically, a crowd is a fixed number of users participating in the protocol.
Some members (users) in the crowd may be corrupted (the attackers), and they can
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collaborate in order to discover the originator’s identity. The purpose of the protocol is
to protect the identity of the message originator from the attackers. When an originator
–also known as initiator– wants to communicate with a server, she creates a random
path between herself and the server through the crowd by the following process.
– Initial step: the initiator selects uniformly at random a member of the crowd (pos-
sibly herself) and forwards the request to her. We refer to the latter user as the
forwarder.
– Forwarding steps: a forwarder, upon receiving a request, flips a biased coin. With
probability 1 − p f she delivers the request to the end server. With probability p f
she selects uniformly at random a new forwarder (possibly herself) and forwards
the request to her. The new forwarder repeats the same forwarding process.
The response from the server to the originator follows the same path in the opposite
direction. Each user (including corrupted users) is assumed to have only access to mes-
sages routed through her, so that she only knows the identities of her immediate prede-
cessor and successor in a path, and the end server.
Informal definition of Probable Innocence. In [16] Reiter and Rubin have proposed a hi-
erarchy of anonymity notions in the context of Crowds. These range from ‘absolute pri-
vacy,’ where the attacker cannot perceive the presence of communication, to ‘provably
exposed,’ where the attacker can prove the sender and receiver relationship. Clearly,
as most protocols used in practice, Crowds cannot ensure absolute privacy in presence
of attackers or corrupted users, but can only provide weaker notions of anonymity. In
particular, in [16] the authors propose an anonymity notion called probable innocence
and prove that, under some conditions on the protocol parameters, Crowds ensures the
probable innocence property to the originator. Informally, they define it as follows:
A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker’s point of view, the sender
appears no more likely to be the originator than to not be the originator. (1)
In other words, the attacker may have reason to suspect the sender of being more likely
than any other potential sender to be the originator, but it still appears at least as likely
that she is not.
The formal property proved by Reiter and Rubin. Let m be the number of users par-
ticipating in the protocol and let c and n be the number of the corrupted and honest
users, respectively, with m = n + c. Since anonymity makes only sense for honest
users, we define the set of anonymous events as A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}, where ai indi-
cates that user i is the initiator of the message. We define the set of observable events as
O = {o1, o2, . . . , on}, where oi indicates that user i forwarded a message to a corrupted
user. We also say that user i is detected by the attacker.
As it is usually the case in the analysis of Crowds, we assume that attackers will
always deliver a request to forward immediately to the end server, since forwarding it
any further cannot help them learn anything more about the identity of the originator.
In [16] Reiter and Rubin formalise their notion of probable innocence via the con-
ditional probability p(I |H) that the initiator is detected given that any user is detected
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at all. Here I denotes the event that it is precisely the initiator to forward the message to
the attacker on the path, and H that there is an attacker in the path. Precisely, probable
innocence holds if p(I |H) ≤ 12 .
In our setting the probability that user j is detected given that user i is the initiator,
can be written simply as p(o j | ai). As we are only interested in the case in which a
user is detected, for simplicity we do not write such condition explicitly. Therefore, the
property proved in [16] (i.e. p(I |H) ≤ 12 ) translates in our setting as:
∀i. p(oi | ai) ≤ 1/2 (2)
Reiter and Rubin proved in [16] that, in Crowds, the following holds:
p(o j | ai) =
1 −
n−1
m p f i = j
1
m p f i , j
Therefore, probable innocence (2) holds if and only if
m ≥ c + 1
p f − 12
p f
3 Probable innocence revisited and extended
In our opinion there is a mismatch between the idea of probable innocence expressed
informally in (1) and the property actually proved by Reiter and Rubin, cf. (2). The
former, indeed, seems to correspond to the following:
∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ 1/2 (3)
It is worth noting that this is also the interpretation given by Halpern and O’Neill [13].
The properties (2) and (3) however coincide under the assumption that the a priori
distribution is uniform, i.e. that each honest user has equal probability of being the
initiator. This is a standard asumption in Crowds.
Proposition 1. If the a priori distribution is uniform, then ∀i, j. p(ai | o j) = p(o j | ai).
Proof. If the a priori distribution is uniform, then for every i we have p(ai) = 1/n where
n is the number of honest users. The probability of user j being detected is also uniform,
and hence equal to 1/n. In fact, every initiator forwards the message to each other user
with the same probability, and each forwarder does the same, hence each user has the
same probability of being detected when she is the initiator, and the same probability
of being detected when she is not the initiator. Therefore we have: p(o j | a j) = p(ok | ak)
and p(o j | ai) = p(ok | ai) for every j, k and i , j, k, and hence:
p(o j) = p(o j ∧ a j) + ∑i, j p(o j ∧ ai)
= p(o j | a j)p(a j) + ∑i, j p(o j | ai)p(ai)
= p(ok | ak)p(ak) + ∑i,k p(ok | ai)p(ai) by symmetry
= p(ok)
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Finally, by using the Bayes theorem, we have:
p(ai | o j) = p(o j | ai) p(ai)p(o j) =
p(o j | ai) · 1/n
1/n
= p(o j | ai)
uunionsq
Corollary 1. If the a priori distribution is uniform, then (2) and (3) are equivalent.
The following proposition points out that in presence of uniform a priori distribu-
tion, the matrix associated to the protocol, i.e. the array of the conditional probabilities
p(o j|ai), has equal elements everywhere except on the diagonal:
Proposition 2. If the a priori distribution is uniform, then there exists a p such that
p(o j | ai) =
 p i = j1−p
n−1 i , j
Proof. As already noted in the proof of Proposition 1, for symmetry reasons we have
p(o j | a j) = p(ok | ak) and p(o j | ai) = p(ok | ai) for every j, k and i , j, k. uunionsq
It is generally the case, in Crowds, that p is (much) greater than (1 − p)/(n − 1), which
means that the user which is detected is also the most likely culprit. This allows us to re-
formulate the property of probable innocence in terms of the (a posteriori) vulnerability
[19] of a protocol, which coincides with the converse of the Bayes risk [6].
Let us briefly recall the definition of vulnerability. The idea is that the adversary
knows the a priori distributions and always ‘bets’ on the most likely culprit. The a pri-
ori vulnerability then is the probability that the adversary guesses the true culprit based
only on the a priori distribution p(a). The a posteriori vulnerability is the average prob-
ability that the adversary guesses the true culprit based on the a posteriori probability
distribution on the agents after the observation, i.e., p(a | o). Formally:
Definition 1 ([19]).
– The a priori vulnerability is V(A) = maxi p(ai)
– The a posteriori vulnerability is V(A |O) = ∑ j p(o j) maxi(p(ai |, o j))
Using the Bayes theorem, we can reformulate V(A |O) as follows:
V(A |O) =
∑
j
max
i
(p(o j|ai) p(ai)) (4)
It is easy to see that probable innocence implies that the a posteriori vulnerability
is smaller than 1/2. The converse also holds, if the a priori distribution is uniform.
Proposition 3.
– If either (2) or (3) holds, then V(A |O) ≤ 1/2.
– If V(A |O) ≤ 1/2 and the a priori distribution is uniform, then (2) and (3) hold.
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We now generalize the concept of probable innocence. Instead than just comparing
the probability of being innocent with the probability of being guilty, we consider the
degree of the probability of being innocent. Similarly for the vulnerability.
Definition 2. Given a real number α ∈ [0, 1], we say that a protocol satisfies
– α-probable innocence if and only if ∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ α
– α-vulnerability if and only if V(A |O) ≤ α.
Clearly α-probable innocence coincides with the standard probable innocence for
α = 1/2. It is also to be remarked that the minimum possible value of α is 1/n, i.e., it
is not possible for a protocol to satisfy α-probable innocence or α-vulnerability if α is
smaller than this value.
4 Probable innocence in presence of extra information
We now consider the notion of probable innocence when we assume that the adversary
has some extra information about the correlation between the culprit and the observable.
We express this extra information in terms of a random variable S , whose values
s1 . . . s` we assume to be observable, and the conditional probabilities p(sk | ai). We as-
sume that, the original observables O and the additional observables S are independent,
for every originator.
Example 1. Consider an instance of the Crowds protocol in which there are two servers,
and assume that the users are divided in two parts, A1 and A2. Assume that each user
in A1, when he is the initiator, has probability p1 to address his message to the first
server (as the final destination of the message). Conversely, assume that each user in
A2 has probability p2 to address the second server. The address of the server appears
in the message, and it is therefore observed by the adversary when he intercepts the
message. It is clear that (because of the way Crowds works) the event that the message
is intercepted is independent from the server to which the message is addressed.
If we indicate by s1 the fact that the message is addressed to the first server, and
by s2 the fact that the message is addressed to the second server, the matrix of the
conditional probabilities corresponding to this example is as follows:
p(s | a) =

p1 a ∈ A1, s = s1
1 − p1 a ∈ A1, s = s2
1 − p2 a ∈ A2, s = s1
p2 a ∈ A2, s = s2
We are interested in exploring how the extra information provided by S and the
conditional probabilities of S given A affects the notion of probable innocence.
We take the point of view that the invariant property should be the one expressed
by (3), generalized by Definition 2. We reformulate this definition to accommodate the
presence of extra information in the observables.
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Definition 3 (α-probable innocence in presence of extra information). Given a real
number α ∈ [0, 1], we say that a protocol satisfies α-probable innocence if and only if
∀i, k. p(ai | oi ∧ sk) ≤ α
The following lemma expresses the relation between the conditional probabilities
with respect to the new observables and the original ones
Lemma 1. ∀i, j, k. p(ai | o j ∧ sk) = p(ai | o j) p(sk | ai)p(sk | o j)
Proof. By Bayes theorem we have, for every i, j, k
p(ai | o j ∧ sk) = p(o j ∧ sk | ai) p(ai)p(o j ∧ sk)
Since we are assuming that, given any originator ai, O and S are independent, we have
p(o j ∧ sk | ai) = p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai), and therefore
p(ai | o j ∧ sk) = p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai) p(ai)p(o j ∧ sk)
We can rewrite p(o j ∧ sk) as p(sk | o j) p(o j). Hence:
p(ai | o j ∧ sk) = p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai) p(ai)p(sk |o j) p(o j)
Finally, using Bayes theorem again, we conclude. uunionsq
We can now prove the presence of extra information reduces the degree α of probable
innocence by a factor q = mini,k
(
p(sk | oi)/p(sk | ai)):
Proposition 4.
– In presence of extra information, a protocol satisfies α-probable innocence if
∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ qα
– If ∀i, j. p(ai | oi) = p(a j | o j), then the above condition is also necessary, i.e. the
protocol satisfies α-probable innocence only if
∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ qα
Proof. Immediate from previous lemma, with j = i. uunionsq
In general the factor q in the above proposition is strictly greater than 0 and strictly
smaller than 1. Note also that, in the case of Crowds, the protocol satisfies the required
symmetry, i.e. the elements in the principal diagonal of the matrix of the conditional
probabilities are all the same (cf. Prop. 2) and therefore the above factor q is strict.
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Example 2. Consider an instance of the Crowds protocol where there are 6 members
(m = 6). One of these members is an attacker (c = 1), and the others are honest (n = 5).
Assume that p f = 3/4 then we have
p(oi | ai) = 1 − n − 1m p f = 1 −
4
6
· 3
4
=
1
2
and, for i , j,
p(o j | ai) = 1m p f =
1
6
· 3
4
=
1
8
Now suppose that, as in Example 1, there are two servers and the honest members
are divided into two groups A1 and A2, where A1 = {1, 2} (resp. A2 = {3, 4, 5}) are
the users which prefer the server 1 (resp. the server 2). Assume that the preference
probabilities p1 = p2 = 3/4, i.e. that the conditional probabilities p(s | a) are given by
p(sk | ai) =

3
4 ai ∈ Ak
1
4 ai < Ak
Because of the independence assumption, the conditional probabilities p(o ∧ s | a)
can be computed as the product p(o | a) p(s | a) (see Fig. 1). From these we can compute
the joint probabilities p(o ∧ s) by using the formula
p(o j ∧ sk) =
∑
i
p(o j ∧ sk | ai) p(ai)
Assuming that the a priori distribution is uniform (p(ai) = 15 ), we obtain the probabili-
ties shown in Fig. 1. From these we can then calculate p(s | o) using the definition
p(sk | o j) = p(sk ∧ o j)p(o j)
and the fact that if A is uniformly distributed then also O is uniformly distributed
(p(o j) = 15 ). Finally, using Bayes theorem, we can calculate the probabilities p(a | o∧ s)
from p(o ∧ s | a), p(o ∧ s), and p(a).
Using the values of p(sk | oi) and p(sk | ai), the factor q = mini,k(p(sk | oi)/p(sk | ai))
in Proposition 4 is evaluated to 3/4. It is easy to see that Proposition 4 holds for this
instance of Crowds, i.e. ∀i, k. p(ai | oi ∧ sk) ≤ α if and only if ∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ qα. In fact
p(ai | oi) = 1/2 and maxi,k p(ai | oi ∧ sk) = 2/3.
We note that in some cases the extra information may contradict the original ob-
servable. For instance it could be the case that user 1, when she is the originator, has
a strong preference for the server 1. So if the attacker receives a message from user 1
addressed to the server 2, it may be better for him to assume that the originator is one
(arbitrary) user from the group that favors the server 2, rather than user 1.
We argue, therefore, that the presence of extra information makes the property of
probable innocence more difficult to satisfy, because the attacker can use the extra in-
formation to improve his guess about the culprit, and he may guess a user which is
not necessarily the one who sent the message to him. Therefore it seems reasonable to
consider the following definition:
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p(o | a) o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
a1 12
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
a2 18
1
2
1
8
1
8
1
8
a3 18
1
8
1
2
1
8
1
8
a4 18
1
8
1
8
1
2
1
8
a5 18
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
2
p(s | a) s1 s2
a1 34
1
4
a2 34
1
4
a3 14
3
4
a4 14
3
4
a5 14
3
4
p(s | o) s1 s2
o1 916
7
16
o2 916
7
16
o3 38
5
8
o4 38
5
8
o5 38
5
8
p(o, s | a) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
a1 38
3
32
3
32
3
32
3
32
1
8
1
32
1
32
1
32
1
32
a2 332
3
8
3
32
3
32
3
32
1
32
1
8
1
32
1
32
1
32
a3 132
1
32
1
8
1
32
1
32
3
32
3
32
3
8
3
32
3
32
a4 132
1
32
1
32
1
8
1
32
3
32
3
32
3
32
3
8
3
32
a5 132
1
32
1
32
1
32
1
8
3
32
3
32
3
32
3
32
3
8
p(o, s) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
9
80
9
80
6
80
6
80
6
80
7
80
7
80
10
80
10
80
10
80
p(a | o, s) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
a1 23
1
6
1
4
1
4
1
4
2
7
1
14
1
20
1
20
1
20
a2 16
2
3
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
14
2
7
1
20
1
20
1
20
a3 118
1
18
1
3
1
12
1
12
3
14
3
14
3
5
3
20
3
20
a4 118
1
18
1
12
1
3
1
12
3
14
3
14
3
20
3
5
3
20
a5 118
1
18
1
12
1
12
1
3
3
14
3
14
3
20
3
20
3
5
Fig. 1. The matrices of the conditional probabilities of Example 2. We use here the notation o, s
to represent o ∧ s.
Definition 4 (α-probable innocence in presence of extra information, safe version).
Given a real number α ∈ [0, 1], a protocol satisfies α-probable innocence if and only if
∀i, j, k. p(ai | o j ∧ sk) ≤ α
However, it turns out that the relation with the original notion of probable innocence
remains the same, and Proposition 4 still provides the appropriate bound:
Proposition 5.
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– In presence of extra information, a protocol satisfies the safe version of α-probable
innocence if
∀i, j. p(ai | o j) ≤ qα
– If ∀i, j. p(ai | oi) = p(a j | o j), then the above condition is also necessary, i.e. the
protocol satisfies the safe version of α-probable innocence only if
∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ qα
where q = mini, j,k
(
p(sk |o j)/p(sk |ai)).
Example 3. Consider again the instance of Crowds like in Example 2, but assume now
that the preference probabilities are much higher than before, namely
p(sk | ai) =

9
10 ai ∈ Ak
1
10 ai < Ak
We can compute the probabilities p(o∧ s | a), p(o∧ s), p(s | o) and p(a | o∧ s) like before.
The results are shown in Fig. 2.
We note that in certain cases the extra knowledge dominates over the original ob-
servables. For instance, if the adversary receives a message from user 3 addressed to
server 1, it is better for him to bet that a sender of group 1 is the originator, rather than
user 3. In fact the a posteriori probability of the latter is p(a3 | o3 ∧ s1) = 1/6 while the
a posteriori probability of (say) user 1 is p(a1 | o3 ∧ s1) = 3/8.
Using the values of p(sk | oi) and p(sk | ai), the factor q = mini,k(p(sk | oi)/p(sk | ai))
in Proposition 4 is evaluated to 2/3, and we can see that Proposition 5 holds for this
instance of Crowds, i.e. ∀i, k. p(ai | oi ∧ sk) ≤ α if and only if ∀i. p(ai | oi) ≤ qα. In fact
p(ai | oi) = 1/2 and maxi, j,k p(ai | o j ∧ sk) = 3/4.
5 Vulnerability in presence of extra information
In this section we explore how the definition of α-vulnerability is affected by the pres-
ence of extra information. Let us start with the definition of α-vulnerability in presence
of the new observables. It is natural to extend the notion of α-vulnerability by consid-
ering the (a posteriori) vulnerability when the observables are constituted by the joint
random variables O, S , which is given by
V(A |O, S ) =
∑
j,k
p(o j ∧ sk) max
i
p(ai | o j ∧ sk)
Hence we extend α-vulnerability as follows:
Definition 5 (α-vulnerability in presence of extra information). Given a real num-
ber α ∈ [0, 1], a protocol satisfies α-vulnerability if and only if V(A |O, S ) ≤ α.
For the next proposition, we consider the specific case in which the protocol satisfies
the symmetry of Crowds.
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p(o | a) o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
a1 12
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
a2 18
1
2
1
8
1
8
1
8
a3 18
1
8
1
2
1
8
1
8
a4 18
1
8
1
8
1
2
1
8
a5 18
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
2
p(s | a) s1 s2
a1 910
1
10
a2 910
1
10
a3 110
9
10
a4 110
9
10
a5 110
9
10
p(s | o) s1 s2
o1 610
4
10
o2 610
4
10
o3 310
7
10
o4 310
7
10
o5 310
7
10
p(o, s | a) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
a1 920
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
1
20
1
80
1
80
1
80
1
80
a2 980
9
20
9
80
9
80
9
80
1
80
1
20
1
80
1
80
1
80
a3 180
1
80
1
20
1
80
1
80
9
80
9
80
9
20
9
80
9
80
a4 180
1
80
1
80
1
20
1
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
20
9
80
a5 180
1
80
1
80
1
80
1
20
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
20
p(o, s) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
6
50
6
50
3
50
3
50
3
50
4
50
4
50
7
50
7
50
7
50
p(a | o, s) o1, s1 o2, s1 o3, s1 o4, s1 o5, s1 o1, s2 o2, s2 o3, s2 o4, s2 o5, s2
a1 34
3
16
3
8
3
8
3
8
1
8
1
32
1
56
1
56
1
56
a2 316
3
4
3
8
3
8
3
8
1
32
1
8
1
56
1
56
1
56
a3 148
1
48
1
6
1
24
1
24
9
32
9
32
9
14
9
56
9
56
a4 148
1
48
1
24
1
6
1
24
9
32
9
32
9
56
9
14
9
56
a5 148
1
48
1
24
1
24
1
6
9
32
9
32
9
56
9
56
9
14
Fig. 2. The matrices of the conditional probabilities of Example 3. We use here the notation o, s
to represent o ∧ s.
Proposition 6. Let ` = |S| denote the cardinality of the extra observables. Assume that,
for each i, p(oi | ai) = p = maxi, j p(o j | ai) and let q = maxi,k p(sk | ai). We have:
1. V(A |O, S ) ≤ α if V(A |O) ≤ α
` q .
2. If the a priori distribution is uniform and (1−p)n−1 q ≤ p (1−q)`−1 , then V(A |O, S ) ≤ α if
and only if V(A |O) ≤ α.
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Proof. By definition we have:
V(A |O, S ) =
∑
j,k
p(o j ∧ sk) max
i
p(ai | o j ∧ sk)
Using Bayes theorem we derive:
V(A |O, S ) =
∑
j,k
max
i
(p(o j ∧ sk | ai) p(ai))
Because of the independence of O and S for any given originator, we deduce:
V(A |O, S ) =
∑
j,k
max
i
(p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai) p(ai)) (5)
1. Since q = maxi,k p(sk | ai), from (5) we derive:
V(A |O, S ) ≤
∑
j,k
max
i
(p(o j | ai) q p(ai)) = ` q
∑
j
max
i
(p(o j | ai) p(ai)) = ` q V(A |O)
2. Since the input distribution is uniform:
V(A |O, S ) = 1
n
∑
j,k
max
i
(p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai))
If (1−p)n−1 q ≤ p (1−q)`−1 then maxi(p(o j | ai) p(sk | ai)) = p(o j | a j) p(sk | a j) = p p(sk | a j).
Hence
V(A |O, S ) = 1
n
∑
j,k
p p(sk | a j) = 1n
∑
j
p
∑
k
p(sk | a j) = 1n
∑
j
p = V(A|O)
uunionsq
It is interesting to note that, in the part (2) of Proposition 6, the extra knowledge does not
make the protocol more vulnerable. This is because the additional knowledge is some-
times in accordance with the best guess based on the original observable, and sometimes
in conflict, but the original observable always dominates, and therefore the additional
knowledge is either redundant or disregarded. In any case, it is not used to make the
guess. In the general case (represented by the first part of the proposition), however,
the additional knowledge may dominate the original observable, and induce the adver-
sary to change his bet, thus increasing his chances. For this reason, the vulnerability
increases in general of a factor `q.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we focussed on the Crowds anonymity protocol and asked the question of
how its existing analyses are affected by taking into account that attackers may have in-
dependent knowledge about users’ behaviours. This amounts to providing the attackers
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with information about the correlation between a set of observables s1, . . . , s` and the
event that user i is the originator of a message, as formalised by the conditional prob-
ability p(sk | ai). We formalised the idea of probable innocence for such systems, both
in standard terms and via the notion of protocol vulnerability, and identified a simple
and neat measure of the impact of independent knowledge. Namely, it makes probable
innocence (resp. vulnerability) more difficult to achieve by a factor q (resp. `q) which
depends on the ratio between the probability of the observables conditional to the orig-
inator and conditional to the user detected (and, in the case of vulnerability, also from
the cardinality of the random variable that represents the extra knowledge).
In conclusion, we remark that although the scenario in which attackers possess or
can acquire extra knowledge is highly likely, it has so far been ignored. In the near
future, we plan to work on the even more interesting scenario in which the attackers use
their ‘beliefs’ about users behaviour to raise the vulnerability of anonymity protocols
such as Crowds.
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